Working Papers
Information Frictions and the Market for Climate Adaptation: Evidence from Index Insurance in Colombia (Job Market Paper)
Climate adaptation markets often fail to form despite the existence of beneficial products. I show that consumers' difficulties evaluating product value are a barrier to demand that can explain missing markets. I focus on index insurance whose coverage remains low despite its potential to protect against climate shocks. To study demand, I develop a behavioral framework that allows for ``cognitive frictions''-- the difficulty in mapping contract terms to value-- and beliefs about average market value. In an RCT with 525 Colombian smallholder farmers, I elicit demand for insurance contracts that vary in value, holding price constant. At baseline, farmers have low elasticities to product value. A climate literacy treatment designed to help farmers understand insurance contracts increases elasticity by 51%. In contrast, an advertising treatment has no effect on elasticity and decreases average demand by 11%, consistent with low insurer reputation.. A simple model rationalizes both findings: cognitive frictions increase firm incentives to provide low value, lowering insurer reputation and ``poisoning'' the market.
Depositor Preferences and Climate Finance (with Jing Lu and Edward Shore)
We study whether banks internalize social deposit risk when arranging syndicated loans to carbon-intensive (‘brown’) borrowers. We construct Democratic Deposit Risk (DDR), a bank-year index that scales the size of a bank’s branch network by the partisan tilt of the counties it serves. Merging FDIC branch data, county-level election results, and U.S. syndicated loans from Dealscan, we document two patterns. Banks with higher DDR are less likely to participate in brown loans and, when they do, structure them with more intensive syndication. These results link banks’ geographic deposit bases to their asset allocation and risk-sharing choices.
Climate Maladaptation and the Commons: Groundwater Management in India (with Nikhil Basavappa)
India is the world’s largest groundwater user, with 90% used for agriculture. Groundwater, however, is a common pool resource, generating a tragedy of the commons that threatens agricultural sustainability. We develop a parsimonious model to show how a popular policy intervention — subsidizing efficient irrigation technology — can exacerbate distortions away from socially optimal groundwater extraction. We test the model’s predictions by leveraging geophysical variation in extraction externalities and a $1.35 billion program subsidizing efficient irrigation. Consistent with the model’s predictions, the policy’s impact depends on the severity of extraction externalities: extraction falls 9.2% in low-externality areas but rises 11.0% in high-externality areas. Low-externality farmers maintain cultivation using less groundwater, while high-externality farmers cultivate more intensively. Finally, the program causes climate-adaptive responses in low-externality areas – reducing extraction during normal rainfall and increasing it during droughts – but the opposite pattern in high-externality areas, consistent with climate maladaptation. Our findings illustrate that the same common pool conditions that typically justify an intervention may also determine its welfare implications.
Works in Progress
Public Information Provision: Subsidy and Bureaucratic Efficiency (with Fernando Ochoa, Daniela Paz Cruzat, and Marcela Zapata)
We study how physical access to ChileAtiende—Chile’s nationwide one-stop service platform—shapes take-up of social programs, with a focus on housing subsidies. We assemble a national, multi-year panel that links (i) the timing and location of ChileAtiende office openings/closures and office-level visit logs, (ii) administrative records on applications and awards for major benefits (with DS01 housing subsidies as a core case), (iii) beneficiary origin and destination addresses to measure distance to the nearest office, and (iv) dated policy announcements that plausibly shift information demand. Our central question is whether improved proximity to an office increases applications and awards—and for whom—versus simply reallocating demand across channels. We test whether effects are stronger for households living nearer (vs. farther) to offices, around office openings, and in response to salient national announcements. The design leverages staggered office rollouts and announcement timing in a difference-in-differences framework with granular location and time fixed effects.
The Salesperson as an Educator: Incentives, Persuasion, and Financial Literacy* (with Brian Jonghwan Lee)
*Currently raising funding. This study examines how financial intermediary incentives and financial literacy interventions shape financial product uptake and consumer protection among unbanked smallholder farmers in rural Colombia. Through a randomized controlled trial, we vary agent compensation structures (fixed versus commission-based pay) and client-focused messaging (financial literacy workshops versus standard promotional materials) to assess impacts on product comprehension, responsible use, and susceptibility to risky financial behaviors. By disentangling the roles of persuasion and information, the study contributes new insights into how agents can serve as effective educators rather than exploitative salespeople. Our findings will directly inform policy and practice, providing actionable evidence for regulators and financial institutions aiming to balance market expansion with consumer welfare.
Insurance and Crop Choice: Experimental Evidence from Zambia* (with Lorenzo Casaburi and Jack Willis)
*Paused due to USAID funding cuts. In the face of increasing climate risk, Zambia has suffered from substantial droughts in the past 20 years, with severe consequences for smallholder farmers. We consider two broad approaches to help farmers adapt and build resilience to this new reality: the provision of crop insurance, to insure farmers in the face of increased risk; and the encouragement of diversification and climate-resilient crop choice. While these two approaches are often considered in isolation, we argue that programs like Zambia’s Food Security Pack program should consider them in unison. Farmers face initial risk and uncertainty when changing crops, making them reluctant to do so, even if it would reduce risk in the long run. Insurance, in overcoming some of this risk, has been shown to increase ex-ante investments, including by changing to more productive crops and varieties (Karlan et al. 2014). Moreover, switching to crops more suited to local agroeconomic conditions is argued to increase productivity substantially (Adamopoulos and Restuccia 2021). Switching to riskier but higher average return crops may thus be another benefit of insurance provision. We study the logistical feasibility of a large randomized controlled trial with Food Security Pack beneficiaries, farmers who meet the income and wealth requirements delineated by the government. Participants are cross randomized into free insurance and crop choice incentive treatments, in order to determine the added value of insurance in experimentation with new crops and higher productivity.
Policy Pieces
- Groundwater management strategies, T20 South Africa 2025
with Nikhil Basavappa, Nitin Bassi, Anik Bhaduri, Soorya K K, Ekansha Khanduja, and Yashita Singh - Can Chile Escape its Inequality Trap? 2024
with Ignacia Lecaros, Daniela Paz Cruzat, Pablo Tillán, and Michael Walton - Inequality in Chile, Perceptions and Patterns, 2023
with Ignacia Lecaros, Daniela Paz Cruzat, Pablo Tillán, and Michael Walton